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The Rehnquist Revolution 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt 
they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area 
of federalism.  Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five 
years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ 
powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immu-
nity.  Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these 
changes.  Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most sig-
nificant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme 
Court’s revival of federalism as a constraint on federal power. 
The federalism decisions are the product of a Court, with five conser-
vative members, deeply committed to protecting state governments from 
federal encroachment.  Virtually all of the recent Supreme Court cases, 
including Bush v. Gore1 and the federalism decisions, have been five-four 
decisions, with the majority comprised of Rehnquist, C. J.; O’Connor, J.; 
Scalia, J.; Kennedy, J.; and Thomas, J.  From a practical perspective, these 
five Justices are the Rehnquist Court. 
In the October 2000 Term, for example, the Court decided seventy-
eight cases; twenty-six were resolved by a five-four margin and in fourteen 
of those, the majority was comprised of Rehnquist, C.J.; O’Connor, J.; 
Scalia, J.; Kennedy, J.; and Thomas, J.  In the October 2002 Term, the 
Court decided seventy-three cases and fifteen were decided five-four, with 
this grouping being the most frequent majority in six cases. 
These five Justices revived federalism in three major ways.  First, the 
Rehnquist Court created new limits on the scope of Congress’ powers.  
Particularly, the Court placed limits on Congress’ authority to legislate 
under the Commerce Clause and under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Second, the Court  greatly expanded the scope of state Sov-
ereign Immunity and protection from suit in federal court.  Third, the Court 
reversed course and held that the Tenth Amendment is a limit on Congres-
  
 * Sydney M. Irmas, Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, Univer-
sity of Southern California.  I want to thank everyone at Franklin Pierce Law School, for their wonder-
ful hospitality and their insightful comments and questions, when I delivered a version of this paper 
there. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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sional power; specifically, that Congress cannot compel state legislative or 
regulatory action.  Individually, and especially collectively, these three 
doctrines dramatically changed the law. 
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival is profoundly misguided be-
cause it denies the federal government needed authority to achieve impor-
tant social objectives, especially advancing freedom and equality.   This 
article considers what the Rehnquist Court has done in each area and why 
the decisions are undesirable changes in the law. 
II.  LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS’ POWERS 
From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceed-
ing the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.  Countless crimi-
nal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power.  It was by 
far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation.  But in the 
last several years, the Supreme Court made it clear that the judiciary will 
enforce strict limits on Congress’ power under this provision. 
In United States v. Lopez,2 the Supreme Court declared the federal Gun 
Free School Zone Act unconstitutional. 3   The Gun Free School Zone Act 
was a federal law that made it a crime to have a firearm within 1,000 feet 
of a school.4  Alphonso Lopez, a twelfth grader at a San Antonio high 
school, was caught with a gun at school.5  The district court convicted Lo-
pez under the law,6 but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held 
that the Gun Free School Zone Act exceeded the scope of Congress’ Com-
merce Clause authority.7 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, in a five-four decision, 
and began by emphasizing that Congress’ powers must be interpreted in a 
limited manner.8  The Court held that Congress could regulate, under the 
Commerce Clause, only in three circumstances.9  Congress may regulate:  
a) the channels of interstate commerce; b) the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce; and c) activities 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.10  The Court found 
  
 2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 567. 
 5. Id. at 551. 
 6. Id. at 552. 
 7. Id. at 567. 
 8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. 
 9. Id. at 558. 
 10. Id. at 558-559. 
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that the federal law prohibiting guns near schools met none of these re-
quirements and thus was unconstitutional.11 
In United States v. Morrison,12 the Court followed Lopez and declared 
unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act.13  This provision had created a federal cause of action for 
victims of gender-motivated violence.14  The case involved a woman, 
Christy Brzonkala, who was allegedly raped by football players at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute.15  The football players were not criminally prose-
cuted and ultimately avoided university discipline.16   Brzonkala sued un-
der the Violence Against Women Act.17  The United States government 
intervened, and defended the law, on the ground that violence against 
women has a substantial effect on the national economy.18  In enacting the 
Violence Against Women Act, Congress held lengthy hearings and found 
that gender-motivated violence costs the American economy billions of 
dollars a year.19 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected these findings as insufficient to 
sustain the law.20  Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Congress was 
regulating non-economic activity that has traditionally been dealt with by 
state laws.21  Moreover, the Court stressed that there is no jurisdictional 
requirement, in the statute, necessitating proof of an effect on interstate 
commerce.22  The Court said that Congress could not justify regulation, in 
this area, by finding that the cumulative impact of an activity has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.23  The Court thus concluded:  
We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that con-
duct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.  The Constitution 
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local.24   
  
 11. Id. at 567. 
 12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 627. 
 14. Id. at 601-602. 
 15. Id. at 601-602.  Virginia Polytechnic Institute is also known as Virginia Tech. 
 16. See id. at 603. 
 17. Id. at 604. 
 18. Id. at 613. 
 19. Sen. Rpt. 103-138 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
 20. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. 
 21. Id. at 618. 
 22. Id. at 613-618. 
 23. Id. at 614. 
 24. Id. at 617-618 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568). 
File: chem[1].final(macro)moyermaier Created on:  3/10/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 9:52 AM 
4 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 2, No. 1 
Lopez and Morrison opened the door to constitutional challenges to 
countless federal laws, especially those that regulate non-economic activi-
ties.  Federal environmental laws, such as the Endangered Species Act,25 
are likely to be challenged on the grounds that the law regulates conduct 
that does not involve channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or activities with a substantial economic effect.  Simi-
larly, federal gun laws, such as those that prohibit possession of a firearm 
while subject to a domestic violence protection order,26 are also likely to be 
challenged. 
Another area where the Court has dramatically limited the scope of 
Congress’ powers, concerns the authority to legislate under Section Five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  This provision empowers Congress to enact 
laws to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.27  In 1997, the Court signifi-
cantly restricted this power by holding, in City of Boerne v. Flores,28 that 
Congress may not use its Section Five powers to expand the scope of rights 
or to create new rights.29 
The Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, declared unconstitutional 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because it exceeded the 
scope of Congress’ Section Five powers.30  The RFRA was adopted in 
1993 to overturn a Supreme Court decision that had narrowly interpreted 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.31  In 1990, the Supreme 
Court had significantly lessened the protections of the Free Exercise 
Clause in Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith.32  Oregon law prohibited the consumption of peyote, a hallu-
cinogenic substance.33  Native Americans challenged this law claiming that 
it infringed their free exercise of religion because their religious rituals 
required the use of peyote.34  Prior Supreme Court precedents upheld gov-
ernment actions burdening religion only if the action was necessary to 
achieve a compelling government purpose.35  The Supreme Court, in 
Smith, changed the law and held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be 
used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability.36  The Oregon law 
prohibiting consumption of peyote was deemed neutral because the law 
  
 25. 16 U.S.C.  § 1538(a)(1) (2000). 
 26. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000). 
 27. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 28. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 29. Id. at 519. 
 30. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 31. Id. at 512. 
 32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 33. Id. at 874. 
 34. Id. at 874. 
 35. See e.g Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
 36. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
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was not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, and it was a law of 
general applicability because it applied to everyone.37 
In response to this decision, Congress overwhelmingly adopted the 
RFRA.38  The RFRA’s express purpose was to overturn Smith and restore 
the Compelling Government Purpose test.39  The RFRA required courts 
considering free exercise challenges, including neutral laws of general ap-
plicability, to uphold the government actions only if they were necessary to 
achieve a compelling purpose.40  Specifically, the RFRA prohibited 
“[g]overnment” from “substantially burden[ing]” a person’s exercise of 
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
unless the government can demonstrate the burden “(1) is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”41  
In Flores, a church in Texas was prevented from constructing a new 
facility because its building was classified as a historic landmark.42  The 
church sued under the RFRA and the city challenged the constitutionality 
of the law.43  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that the RFRA 
was unconstitutional44 because Congress, under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, may not create new rights or expand the scope of ex-
isting rights.45  He further noted Congress is limited to enacting laws that 
prevent or remedy violations of rights recognized by the Supreme Court.46  
These must be narrowly tailored – “proportionate” and “congruent” – to 
the constitutional violation.47 
Justice Kennedy explained that Section Five gives Congress the au-
thority to enact laws “to enforce” the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.48  He stated:   
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause  
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.  Congress does not en-
force a constitutional right by changing what the right is.  It has 
been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.  Were it not so, what 
  
 37. Id. at 890. 
 38. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 515-516;  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1994). 
 42. Flores, 521 U.S at 511-512. 
 43. Id. at 512. 
 44. Id. at 536. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 519. 
 47. Id. at 520. 
 48. Id. at 519. 
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Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaning-
ful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”49 
Congress thus, is limited to enacting laws that prevent or remedy viola-
tions of rights already recognized by the Supreme Court.  Moreover, the 
Court said, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”50  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion declared the RFRA unconstitutional on 
the grounds that it impermissibly expanded the scope of rights and that it 
was not proportionate, or congruent, as a preventative or remedial meas-
ure.51 
This is a radical change in the law.  No prior case has hinted at such a 
limit on Congress’ powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  The decision opens the door to challenges to many federal laws.  In 
three cases since Flores, namely Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 52 Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents,53 and University of Alabama v. Garrett,54 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that Congress, under Section Five, cannot expand the scope of 
rights and that any federal law must be a “proportionate” and “congruent” 
measure to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.  All three of these 
cases involved the issue of whether a federal law is a valid exercise of 
Congress’ Section Five powers and thus a permissible basis for suing state 
governments.55  In all three cases, the Court found that the federal laws at 
issue did not fit within the scope of Section Five under Flores.  These three 
cases are presented in detail in the next section, which discusses Congress’ 
power to authorize suits against state governments.  
Together the limits on Congress’ powers, under the Commerce Clause 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, open the door to chal-
lenges to numerous federal laws.  Even more profoundly, the Court re-
versed fifty years of expansive federal powers and imposed significant 
constraints on Congress’ authority. 
These decisions can be criticized on many grounds.  They all involve 
the most conservative Justices, creating significant limits on federal power, 
so as to limit the ability of Congress to achieve socially desirable results.  
  
 49. Id. (brackets in original). 
 50. Id. at 520. 
 51. Id. at 536. 
 52. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 53. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 54. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 55. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 629 (discussing the Patent Remedy Act’s constitutionality under 
Section Five); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (discussing ADEA’s constitutionality under Section Five); 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (discussing Title I of the ADA’s constitutionality under Section Five). 
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Preventing guns near schools, providing a remedy to victims of domestic 
violence, and expanding religious freedom, are all good things that the 
Court is limiting.  These restrictions on federal power are a radical change 
in constitutional principles that have been followed since 1937 and are 
particularly undesirable when looked at from the perspective of freedom 
and liberty. 
The Boerne decision means that people in the United States have far 
less protection for their religious practices.  Laws of general applicability, 
whether prison regulations, zoning ordinances or historical landmark laws, 
that seriously burden religion might have been successfully challenged 
under the RFRA, but not any longer.  Put simply, Boerne means that many 
claims of free exercise of religion, that would have prevailed, now cer-
tainly will lose.  People in the United States have less protection of their 
rights after Boerne than they did before it. 
There has been one other aspect of the Court’s Section Five decisions:  
the Court has ruled that Congress cannot use this provision to regulate pri-
vate conduct.  In the Civil Rights Cases,56 in 1883, the Supreme Court 
greatly limited Congress’ ability to use its power under the Reconstruction 
Amendments to regulate private conduct.57 
In United States v. Guest,58 five Justices, although not in a single opin-
ion, concluded that Congress may outlaw private discrimination, pursuant 
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.59  Guest involved a federal 
law which made it illegal for two or more persons to go “in disguise on the 
highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his 
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege.”60  The Court held that 
interference with the use of facilities in interstate commerce violated the 
law, whether motivated by a racial animus or not.61  
The majority opinion did not reach the question of whether Congress 
could regulate private conduct under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment;62  however, six of the Justices, three in a concurring opinion 
and three in a dissenting opinion, expressed the view that Congress could 
prohibit private discrimination under its Section Five powers.63  Justice 
Tom Clark, in a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Hugo Black and 
Abe Fortas, said, “the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to 
enact laws punishing all conspiracies - with or without state action - that 
  
 56. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
 57. Id.  
 58. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 59. Id.  at 755. 
 60. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). 
 61. Guest, 383 U.S. at 760. 
 62. Id. at 756. 
 63. Id. at 755. 
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interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”64  Likewise, Justice William 
Brennan in an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, joined 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Douglas, concluded that 
Congress may prohibit private discrimination pursuant to Section Five.65 
But in Morrison, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the Civil 
Rights Cases and disavowed the opinions to the contrary from Guest.66   As 
described above, in the discussion of Congress’ commerce power, Morri-
son involved a constitutional challenge to the civil damages provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act, which authorized victims of gender-
motivated violence to sue under federal law.67 
The United States government intervened, to defend the law, arguing 
along with the plaintiff that the civil damages provision was constitutional, 
both as an exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power and of its au-
thority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.68   As explained 
above, the Court in a five-four decision held the law exceeded the scope of 
the Commerce power because Congress cannot regulate non-economic 
activity based on a cumulative impact on interstate commerce.69 
By the same five-four margin, the Court held that the law is not consti-
tutional as an exercise of Congress’ Section Five power.70  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist writing for the Court said that Congress, under this authority, 
may regulate only state and local governments, not private conduct.71  
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on “the time-honored principle that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”72  
He said that the opinions in Guest, indicating Congressional power to regu-
late private conduct, were only dicta.73   Thus, the civil damages provision, 
of the Violence Against Women Act, was deemed to exceed the scope of 
Congress’ Section Five powers because it “is not aimed at proscribing dis-
crimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself 
proscribe; it is directed not at any state or state actor, but at individuals 
who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”74 
Again, it is clear that this decision, in the name of federalism, de-
creases protection of individuals.  Congress is denied the ability to expand 
  
 64. Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 65. 383 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 623-624. 
 67. See id. at 601-602. 
 68. See generally U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 69. Id. at 617. 
 70. Id. at 627. 
 71. Id. at 616. 
 72. Id. at 621. 
   73    Id. at 624. 
 74. Id. at 626. 
File: chem[1].final(macro)moyermaier Created on: 3/10/2004 2:25 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 9:52 AM 
2004 REHNQUIST REVOLUTION 9 
rights and protections against private infringers of liberty.  More generally, 
the Court’s narrowing of Congress’ ability to protect rights is inherently 
rights regressive.  Perhaps there is some other justification for what the 
Court has done, but the limitation on Congress’ Section Five powers 
clearly lessens the protection of rights. 
Whatever its other merits, there is no possible argument that Morrison 
advances liberty.   Congress enacted a law, to expand the rights of victims 
of gender-motivated violence, based on findings of a serious social prob-
lem and the inadequacy of remedies in the state courts.  The Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of the statute thus restricts the rights of women 
throughout the country.  Conceivably, it could be argued that Morrison 
protects the rights of those accused of sexual violence, by preventing them 
from being sued in federal court.  Then the question would have to be, 
which is more rights progressive: expanding the ability of victims of gen-
der-motivated violence to sue or protecting those accused of such acts from 
being sued?  Merely stating the question makes the answer obvious. 
III.  THE EXPANSION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The Rehnquist Court made another key change in the law.   The Su-
preme Court significantly expanded the scope of state Sovereign Immu-
nity.  In Alden v. Maine,75 the Court held that a state government may not 
be sued in state court, even on a federal claim, without its consent, because 
of state Sovereign Immunity.76  Alden involved a claim by probation offi-
cers in Maine, that they were owed overtime pay under the Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act.77  They sued in federal court, but their suit was dis-
missed because of the Eleventh Amendment.78  Then the probation officers 
sued in state court.79  The Supreme Court in a five-four decision, however, 
held that Sovereign Immunity broadly protects state governments and pre-
cludes suits against un-consenting states in state courts.80 
In a series of recent cases, the Court has greatly limited the ability of 
Congress to authorize suits against state governments in federal courts.  In 
1996, the conservative majority of the Court held, in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida,81 that Congress may authorize suits against states only pursuant to 
  
 75. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 76. Id. at 732. 
 77. Id. at 711. 
 78. Id. at 712. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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laws enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.82  As de-
scribed above, in Flores, the Court limited Congress’ Section Five powers 
to enacting laws that prevent or remedy violations of rights recognized by 
the Supreme Court; Congress cannot expand the scope of rights or create 
new rights.83 
The combination of Seminole Tribe and Flores has already had a dev-
astating effect on many types of claims.  In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that 
state governments could not be sued for patent infringement;84  in Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, the Court decided that state governments may 
not be sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act;85 and 
in University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court ruled that state governments 
may not be sued for employment discrimination in violation of section one 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.86  In each case, the Court, in a five-
four decision, concluded that Congress expanded the scope of rights, and 
that the laws could not be justified as narrowly tailored to prevent or rem-
edy constitutional violations. 
These decisions mean that state governments cannot be sued, when 
they violate federal law.  How can the supremacy of federal law be assured 
and vindicated if states can violate the Constitution, or federal laws, and 
not be held accountable?   
At oral argument in Alden, the Solicitor General of the United States, 
Seth Waxman, quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI.87  Waxman contended that suits against states are essential to assure the 
supremacy of federal law.88  Justice Kennedy’s response to this argument is 
astounding.  He states: 
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign im-
munity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomi-
tant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.  The 
States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the 
Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitu-
tional design.   We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to 
honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United 
States.   The good faith of the States thus provides an important as-
  
 82. Id. at 60. 
 83. 521 U.S. at 519-520.  
 84. 527 U.S. at 629. 
 85. 528 U.S. at 82. 
 86. 531 U.S. at 356. 
 87. Seth Waxman, Oral Argument Supreme Court of the United States, Alden v. Maine (Washington 
D.C., Mar. 31, 1999) (copy of transcript on file at 1999 WL 216178 (U.S.)). 
 88. Id. 
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surance that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land.”89 
What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply with 
federal law?  Is it the trust in the good faith of state governments?  Is it 
possible to imagine that thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the civil 
rights movement the Supreme Court would have issued such a statement; 
state governments simply could be trusted to voluntarily comply with fed-
eral law?  Justice Kennedy’s words in Alden reflect the Rehnquist Court’s 
strong faith in state governments and desire to limit both federal legislative 
and judicial power. 
Sovereign Immunity is an anachronistic relic.  The principle of Sover-
eign Immunity is derived from English law, which assumed that “the King 
can do no wrong.”90  Since the time of Edward the First, the Crown of Eng-
land has not been suable unless it has specifically consented to suit.91  
Throughout American history, United States courts have applied this prin-
ciple, 92  although they often have admitted that its justification in this 
country is unclear.93   
A doctrine derived from the premise, “the King can do no wrong,” de-
serves no place in American law.  The United States was founded on a 
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives.94  American government 
is based on the fundamental recognition that the government and govern-
ment officials can do wrong and must be held accountable.  Sovereign 
Immunity undermines that basic notion. 
Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with the United States Constitu-
tion.   Nowhere does the document mention, or even imply, that govern-
ments have complete immunity to suit.  Sovereign Immunity is a doctrine 
based on a common law principle borrowed from the English common 
law.95   However, Article VI of the Constitution states that the Constitution, 
  
 89. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-755. 
 90. See Kenneth Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 5, § 27:2, 6-7 (2d ed., K.C. Davis Pub. 
Co. 1984) (quoting Blackstone); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, vol. 2, 210 
(West 1985). 
 91. U. S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882). 
 92. Id. at 207. (“The principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always 
been treated as an established doctrine.”) (citations omitted). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See e.g. U.S. Const. art. I § 9 (stating “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States.”). 
 95. See supra n. 90, at 6-7; Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, vol. 2, 210 
(West 1985).  Actually, as John Orth pointed out to me, the phrase, “the King can do no wrong,” has 
many possible meanings.  It might simply mean that when a wrong occurs, someone else must have 
done it, because the King can do no wrong.  Alternatively, it might mean that a remedy must exist, 
because the King cannot do a wrong, as would occur if a harm went un-remedied.  
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and laws made pursuant to them, are the supreme law and, as such, it 
should prevail over claims of Sovereign Immunity.96  Yet, Sovereign Im-
munity, a common law doctrine, trumps even the United States Constitu-
tion and bars suits against government entities, when they violate the Con-
stitution and federal laws. 
Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with a central maxim of American 
government:  that no one, not even the government, is above the law.  The 
effect of Sovereign Immunity is to place the government above the law.  It 
ensures that some individuals who have suffered egregious harms will be 
unable to receive redress for their injuries.97   The judicial role of enforcing 
and upholding the Constitution is rendered illusory when the government 
has complete immunity to suit.  Moreover, Sovereign Immunity under-
mines the basic principle, announced in Marbury v. Madison,98 that “[t]he 
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individ-
ual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”99 
IV.  REVIVAL OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
A final aspect of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival has been its 
use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power.  In the first third 
of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Amend-
ment reserved a zone of activities for exclusive state control.  In Hammer 
v. Dagenhart,100 for example, the Court struck down a federal law prohibit-
ing child labor on the grounds that it violated the Tenth Amendment.101  
After 1937, however, the Court rejected this view.102  No longer was the 
Tenth Amendment seen as a limit on federal power.  It was just a reminder 
that Congress could not act unless there was express or implied constitu-
tional authority. 
Professor Laurence Tribe remarked that “[f]or almost four decades af-
ter 1937, the conventional wisdom was that federalism in general - and the 
rights of states in particular - provided no judicially enforceable limits on 
congressional power.”103   In 1976, the Court appeared to revive federalism 
  
 96. U.S. Const. art. VI. 
 97. John E. H. Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the 
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and the New York Courts of Claims, 22 Admin. L. 
Rev. 39, 56 (1969). 
 98. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 99. Id. at 163. 
 100. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 101. Id. at 277. 
 102. See U. S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).   
 103. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 378 (2d ed. Foundation Press, Inc. 1987). 
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as a limit on Congressional powers in National League of Cities v. 
Usery,104 where the Court invalidated a federal law that required state and 
local governments to pay their employees a minimum wage.105   The Court, 
in an opinion by then Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress could not regu-
late states in areas of “traditional” or “integral” state responsibility.106  But 
just nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority,107 the Court expressly overruled National League of Cities.108  Jus-
tice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, said that he believed that his view would 
again triumph on the Court.109  
In two decisions, the Rehnquist Court has done just that, and it revived 
the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on Congress’ authority.  In New York 
v. United States,110 the Court, for only the second time in fifty-five years 
and the first time since the overruled National League of Cities decision, 
invalidated a federal law as violating the Tenth Amendment.111   In New 
York, the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1985112 created a statutory duty for states to provide for the safe disposal 
of radioactive wastes generated within their borders.113  The Act provided 
monetary incentives for states to comply with the law, allowing states to 
impose a surcharge on radioactive wastes received from other states.114  
Additionally, and most controversially, the law provided that states would 
“take title” to any wastes within their borders that was not properly dis-
posed of by January 1, 1996, to ensure effective state government action.115  
The state government would “be liable for all damages directly or indi-
rectly incurred.”116 
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress, pursuant to its authority under 
the Commerce Clause, could regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes;117  
however, by a six-three margin, the Court held that the “take title” provi-
sion of the law is unconstitutional, because its gives state governments the 
choice between “either accepting ownership of waste or regulating accord-
  
 104. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 105. Id. at 855-856. 
 106. Id. at 853-855. 
 107. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 108. Id. at 531. 
 109. Id. at 580. 
 110. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 111. Id. 
 112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021e (1988).  
 113. Id. at §§ 2021c(a)(1)(A).  
 114. Id. at §§ 2021e(d)(1). 
 115. Id. at §§ 2021d(2)(c)(i). 
 116. Id. 
 117. N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992). 
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ing to the instructions of Congress.”118  Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
Court, said that it was impermissible for Congress to impose either option 
on the states.119  Forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive wastes 
would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments120 and requiring 
state compliance with federal regulatory statutes would impermissibly im-
pose, on states, a requirement to implement federal legislation.121  The 
Court concluded that it was “clear” that because of the Tenth Amendment, 
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact, or adminis-
ter, a federal regulatory program.”122   
A few years later, in Printz v. United States,123 the Court applied and 
extended New York.  Printz involved a challenge to the federal Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act.124  The law required that the “chief law 
enforcement officer,” of each local jurisdiction, conduct background 
checks before issuing permits for firearms.125  The Court, in a five-four 
decision, found that the law violated the Tenth Amendment.126 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and revived the phrase “dual sov-
ereignty,” to explain the structure of American government.127  The Court 
concluded that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by compelling 
states to implement federal mandates.128 
These decisions can be criticized on many levels.  The anti-
commandeering principle that these decisions rest on has no constitutional 
basis.  Indeed, for a Justice who emphasizes text as the central focus of 
constitutional analysis, these conclusions should be especially troubling.  
Where the Constitution wanted state sovereignty to be constitutionally 
protected, the text provides such protection.  For example, barring suits 
against states by citizens from other states and, perhaps, in the Tenth 
Amendment.  But in other areas, it is troubling that such Justices allow a 
non-textual value to trump textual protections. 
More generally, the key question is:  Why is protecting states so im-
portant that it should be seen as limiting the very definition of Congres-
sional powers under Article I?  If the Court is serious, that state sover-
eignty restricts the scope of Article I, entirely apart from Tenth Amend-
  
 118. Id. at 175. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 176. 
 122. Id. at 188. 
 123. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). 
 125. Id. at § 922 (s)(2). 
 126. Prinz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 127. Id. at 918. 
 128. Id. at 935. 
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ment considerations, then New York has even broader implications than 
generally recognized.  The case could portend a return to pre-1937 consti-
tutional jurisprudence, where the Court also used considerations of state 
sovereignty, to narrowly define the scope of federal powers, such as defin-
ing commerce to apply to only one stage of business, distinct from mining, 
manufacture, or production.  Although it is unlikely that these particular 
distinctions will reemerge, others could arise in the future. 
The anti-commandeering principle in New York and Printz is based on 
ensuring government accountability.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New 
York, emphasized that when Congress compels state government action, 
accountability is undermined.129  She explained that Congress can make the 
decision, but then states are held politically responsible for the decision 
that is not theirs.130 
On the one hand, Justice O’Connor is to be commended for articulat-
ing an explicit value of federalism; something that is all too rare in the fed-
eralism cases. On reflection, however, the factual assumptions behind Jus-
tice O’Connor’s position are highly questionable.  Justice O’Connor as-
sumes that if Congress forces the states to do something, voters will not 
hold Congress responsible, but will blame the conduct on the primary ac-
tor, state governments.  Voters, however, can surely understand that the 
state is acting because it is required to by federal law.  Federal mandates 
force every person to do unwanted things.  Paying taxes is a simple exam-
ple.  Why would people not understand that state governments, might also 
have to do something because of a federal mandate? 
State government officials, of course, can explain to the voters that the 
federal government required the particular actions.  Justice O’Connor 
never explains why the federal government will not be held accountable 
under such circumstances. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to overstate the significance of these changes in consti-
tutional law.  For over fifty years, after 1937, the assumption was that 
Congress’ powers were to be broadly interpreted.  The Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Constitution to empower the federal government to deal with 
national problems.  Now, however, the Court is restricting congressional 
powers and aggressively protecting state governments.  
  
 129. New York, 505 U.S. at 168. 
 130. Id. at 168-169. 
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The key question is what, if anything, is gained by this change in the 
law?  Is the country better or worse because of these rulings?  It is striking 
to look at the laws that the Rehnquist Court has invalidated: statutes pro-
hibiting guns near schools; allowing victims of gender-motivated violence 
to sue; expanding religious freedom; permitting states to be sued for patent 
infringement and employment discrimination against the elderly and peo-
ple with disabilities; requiring states to clean up nuclear wastes; and man-
dating that state and local governments do background checks before issu-
ing permits for firearms.  All of these are enormously desirable and impor-
tant laws; most passed Congress by overwhelming margins. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions invalidating these laws serve no appar-
ent purpose other than the goal of limiting federal power. The rulings, 
which are a dramatic change in course in constitutional law, are a policy 
choice by the conservatives on the current Court.   I have no doubt that 
someday a new set of Justices will reverse these cases, and return to the 
broad definitions of federal power, which were followed from 1937 until 
the 1990s.  The complex world, of the early twenty-first century, demands 
a federal government with the powers to handle its national problems. 
 
